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Organisation and governance of urban 
energy systems: district heating and 
cooling in the UK. 
1. The UK political-economic context for district 
heating and cooling 
The transformation of fossil fuel energy systems into sustainable energy for 
resilient urban settlements is a profound challenge. Global demand for energy 
is accelerating and prices are increasing, at the same time that climate 
science is demonstrating the major risks of unabated carbon emissions. In 
addition, in many of the older industrialised centres of Europe, ageing plant 
and infrastructure are reducing system resilience, in the face of a changing 
climate. This paper focuses on the situation in the UK, where there are 
significant uncertainties about the organisation, governance and financing of 
low carbon energy systems, despite ambitious climate change legislation. 
Public policy is focused mainly at macro and micro levels: national-level 
responses emphasise legislation and regulation to incentivise large-scale 
utility investment, while building-level responses focus on household 
behaviour change, demand-side efficiency and micro-generation. Our 
research examines the neglected meso-level of city- or urban-scale 
responses, particularly in relation to district heating and cooling2 (DHC) and 
combined heat and power (CHP). It examines the ways in which the potential 
for locally innovative leadership at city-scale is conditioned by structures of 
finance capital and system incumbents. From the perspective of city 
authorities, an active role promises local social and economic benefits 
including mitigating pollution, retaining greater proportions of energy 
payments in local economies, reducing energy costs and cost fluctuations for 
residents, businesses and public sector organisations, and contributing to 
regeneration. 
Locally-accessible technical, financial and legal expertise and capacities for 
municipal authorities to play an active part in transition to sustainable urban 
heat and power are however tenuous. UK local authorities have had very 
limited roles in energy services for almost a century. Their role in provision 
was radically reduced by reorganisation of small municipal companies into 
central and regional boards in the 1920s, and then removed by the post-war 
nationalisation and centralisation of the 1940s, which spurred the corporatist 
era spanning the 1950s to the 1980s (Hannah 1982; Wilson & Game 2002). 
The current UK energy system can be characterised as a web of social and 
technical  commitments  (or  ‘lock-ins’)  to  large  scale  and  remote  production  and  
generation, and associated delocalised ownership and governance. In the 
1980s, industry liberalisation and privatisation (and the freeing-up of oil and 
                                            
2 The majority of UK initiatives focus on heat provision, but we include cooling to reflect 
provision by some systems such as Birmingham and Southampton; heat networks can 
provide cooling by connection of in-building absorption chillers. 
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gas reserves internationally), prompted a further profound shift away from 
national systems of energy production, to international flows of capital, 
technology, fuel supplies, and international ownership of power companies 
and equipment suppliers (Winskel, 2002). International flows of capital via the 
dominant energy companies seek delocalised, replicable investment 
opportunities, which produce predictable returns on investment. Liberalisation 
hence resulted in running-down of long-term investment programmes, a shift 
away  from  capital  intensive  technology,  and  an  emphasis  on  ‘asset  sweating’  
and short-term investment horizons.  
Significantly, some other longstanding features of the UK energy system 
survived liberalisation: the relative neglect of energy efficiency and 
conservation, and of regional and local interests (Smith, 2007) have worked 
against combined heat and power (CHP) with DHC (Russell 1996). Despite a 
host of recent policy initiatives introduced to help meet ambitions for 
decarbonisation and enhanced security of supply, the UK energy system of 
the early-2010s still reflects an embedded orientation to large scale supply 
technologies, fossil fuels, and national level infrastructures, and a relative 
neglect of energy demand management, regional or local interests, and 
environmental policy imperatives. In the absence of strong and persistent 
external pressures or system shocks, these features privilege some pathways 
for system change above others (Winskel, 2011).  
CHP-DHC has a long history at the margins of the UK energy system. This 
stands in contrast to the municipal energy companies in Scandinavia which 
were able to develop DHC systems as part of an integrated approach to urban 
infrastructure (Dyrelund & Steffensen, 2004; Ericson, 2009; Rutherford, 2008). 
For much of the twentieth century, UK engineers pursued a strategy of 
increasing efficiency through larger turbines, leading the electricity system to 
develop both physically and institutionally around large centralised plant, and 
creating conditions which undermined the economics of small scale CHP 
(Russell, 1993). Much of this infrastructure remains, and the liberalised 
market structures which have emerged around existing plant favour the large 
incumbent companies (Mitchell, 2008; Toke & Fragaki, 2008; Kelly & Pollit, 
2010). In the 1970s, Walter Marshall highlighted the potential of CHP/DH to 
supply a significant proportion of overall heat demand (Department of Energy, 
1979). However, he also noted that without active planning and policy 
instruments, its role in the UK was likely to be greatly restricted by the growth 
of natural gas.  
The recent return to planning and top-down steering of the UK energy system 
(viz. the Carbon Plan (DECC, 2011a), National Infrastructure Plan (HMT, 
2011), and National Policy Statements for Energy (DECC, 2011b)), 
nevertheless raise questions about whether the long-identified potential of 
CHP-DHC may now be realised – or whether it will continue to suffer from the 
relative neglect of being caught between large scale supply-side projects and 
infrastructure, and householder-level demand-side measures. As of the early 
2010s, policy support for CHP-DHC had yet to manifest itself forcefully onto 
the centre-stage of UK energy policy. There are some signs that UK policy 
and regulation may undergo a more thorough remaking, possibly including 
measures to support CHP-DH under the forthcoming UK Heat Strategy, but a 
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combination of deep-seated path-dependencies and recently imposed 
imperatives for expansion of national-level infrastructures seem likely to work 
against a radical change toward urban community-led heat provision. The UK 
Government recently concluded that there  was  ‘no  reasonable  alternative’  to  a  
massive re-investment  in  the  UK’s  national  system  of  electricity  generation  
and  transmission:  ‘[we do] not believe that decentralised and community 
energy systems can lead to significant replacement of larger-scale 
infrastructure’  (DECC,  2011b, p.24).  
Despite these circumstances, urban authorities are expected by central 
government to reduce regional carbon emissions. Some of these have 
developed urban DHC networks by finding an array of niche solutions to 
myriad challenges. In this paper we explore three of these projects, framing 
them as Local Energy Governance and Organisation (LEGO) models to 
emphasise both their atypical (in contemporary UK context) nature, but also to 
highlight the work done to configure the heterogeneous components of the 
system with the aim of establishing a stable foundation for urban heat and 
cooling networks. 
2. Socio-technical and economic characteristics  
DHC systems transport heat and cooling through highly insulated pipes. 
Assets have long lifespans, typically forty years for pipework, and in common 
with other infrastructure, the upfront development costs are high, while the 
marginal costs of system use (generation, distribution and transfer of heat) 
are generally low (Helm, 2010). Sunk costs are typically recovered by above-
marginal-cost charges for heat, with business models requiring a number of 
years to break even. The lifetime costs of the system can be reduced by 
maximising the heat delivered, targeting areas of high heat demand and 
recruiting users with diverse daily and seasonal heat demand profiles. Large 
anchor loads stabilise a system by reducing the risks and complexity of 
ensuring sufficient heat demand over the long term (Pöyry Energy, 2009; 
Roberts, 2008; Summerton, 1992). 
The character of DHC creates particular organisational constraints. The 
temporal dislocation between sunk costs and subsequent revenues means 
that judgements of economic viability of particular system configurations are 
highly sensitive to the cash-flow discount rate adopted. This is in turn 
dependent on the objectives of the organisation(s) developing and financing 
the system, and the risks they perceive. The long cost recovery period 
establishes mutual interdependencies: system builders rely on the on-going 
heat demand of subscribers. Consequently they are exposed to off-take risks 
created  by  uncertainty  in  users’  long-term heat demand and potential to 
switch to alternative supply systems. Subscribers are dependent on the 
system for provision of a critical service, and may face significant cost and 
information barriers to changing supply. The long term cash flow profile also 
creates a risk to the system owner that, at some future point, public authorities 
will introduce regulations requiring reduced heat prices which reflect marginal 
costs rather than average lifetime costs, effectively forcing the write-off of 
sunk costs (Helm, 2010). 
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Cash flow characteristics are not the only constraints on project structures. 
The socio-technical terrain into which a system is woven is complex and 
place-specific, encompassing the physical characteristics and ownership of 
land and buildings, existing building heating technologies, established energy 
contracts, user practices and expectations, and interfaces with other energy 
systems. Windows of opportunity for retrofitting, created by regeneration or 
new infrastructure construction, are frequently difficult to coordinate with the 
variable timescales of different actors. Social constraints, such as the 
willingness of subscribers to connect to DHC, can be more difficult and time 
consuming to resolve than physical constraints (Summerton, 1992).  
3. Theorising local energy governance and 
organisation (LEGO)  
Creating and maintaining viable DHC consequently requires discovery of 
project pathways adapted to the demands of political-economy, network 
technology and local circumstances. This type of place-specific socio-
technical formation has been variously characterised as a locally-styled socio-
technical system (Hughes, 1982), a Grid Based Multi-Organisation (GBMO) 
(Summerton, 1992), and as a local network organisation comprised of ‘an 
array of the heterogeneous bits and pieces that is necessary to the successful 
production of any working device’ (Law and Callon, 1992: 22). The 
configuration of the local network organisation enables development to 
proceed, but the actors vary in their relationship, and commitment, to the 
particular system and locality.  In  Law  and  Callon’s  terms,  the  local  network  
may need access to non-local financial and technical knowledge networks to 
support development. During the establishment of DHC in Sweden, for 
example, the Swedish District Heating Association (SDHA) was a key site for 
knowledge development and dissemination. It was critical to the speedy 
elimination of poorly performing pipework, and set technical standards to 
prevent municipalities becoming locked-in to particular component suppliers 
and incompatible infrastructures (Ericson, 2009).  
In the UK, establishing development pathways is likely to be more demanding 
than Scandinavian experiences suggest, due to the political-economy of 
centralised energy markets and global finance, matched by uncertain state 
commitment to regional contributions to low carbon energy. The institutions 
and networks of the UK DHC system are weakly developed, as indicated by 
lack of dedicated regulation, intermittent and unpredictable grant funding, 
under-developed technical standards, and knowledge held as intellectual 
property of consultants and contractors rather than in the public domain 
(Hawkey, 2012). Knowledge about, and legitimacy of, urban DHC is therefore 
lacking. Significant transaction costs, associated with complex intra- and inter-
party negotiations, are incurred in establishing de novo the legitimacy, and the 
sustainability value, of the technology, and of local energy investment. A 
common understanding of objectives, governance, business models, and 
shares of risks and rewards has to be built among stakeholders. Multiple 
organisations are likely to be involved in gathering data, recruiting subscribers, 
and designing a network, as well as in construction, operation and 
maintenance.  
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In this context, the municipal authority is likely to be a key actor. It has unique 
potential to develop the requisite knowledge and legitimacy. In more 
favourable circumstances in other European countries, local authorities have 
conventionally played important roles in supporting and stabilising (if not 
actively developing) heat networks (Grohnheit & Gram Mortensen, 2003). 
Their local democratic status confers long-term commitment to place, legal 
powers and duties, and control over assets and resources. As the operator of 
a large diverse estate with low risk of insolvency, and local responsibilities for 
many services, municipalities can act as focal customers and intermediaries. 
In addition their planning powers can be used to ensure co-location of heat 
demand and heat sources, and to coordinate DHC development with other 
infrastructure or regeneration investments. They can help to recruit 
subscribers by adopting supportive planning policies, ranging from requiring 
developers to calculate the costs and benefits of joining a system, to the more 
directive option of stipulating that buildings within particular areas are required 
to connect. In the absence of regulatory frameworks, LAs play an important 
role in quasi-regulation, reducing the risk of future changes to the regulatory 
regime, and avoiding the prospect of having to write off sunk investments. The 
municipality may hence play a critical part in risk mitigation, co-ordination and 
deployment. 
UK local authorities (LAs) have less autonomy than their European 
counterparts, however: they are subject to centralised budgetary control of 
taxation and revenues (Wilson & Game, 2002) and are constrained by the 
ultra vires principal to undertake only those activities permitted by statute. 
Reforms to their role in service delivery, driven from the centre since the 
1980s by neoliberal imperatives of competition, have complicated and 
weakened local governance. A range of functions previously undertaken, 
including housing provision, public transport, waste management and estate 
management, have been variously outsourced or privatised (Leach & Percy-
Smith, 2001). This has both multiplied the number of actors involved in local 
governance and reduced the in-house capacities of LAs to develop and 
provide services. 
Their relatively weak position makes LEGO models for the UK highly 
challenging. Even though municipal capacities are expected to be a 
necessary component of development, experience shows that they are not 
sufficient; only some urban authorities have developed DHC. Other research 
suggests that local social capital may be an essential component in urban 
energy innovation, especially in poorly performing regional innovation systems. 
Without this ‘most  important  missing  ingredient’  (Cooke  et  al.  2000:  152),  the 
other factors of the necessary GBMO/local network are unlikely to be 
adequate. Though a contested term (Tura and Harmaakorpi, 2005), the 
concept of social capital essentially refers to the potential of a social system to 
learn effectively through interaction.  The  OECD  defined  social  capital  as  ‘the  
networks  …  norms,  values  and  understandings  that  facilitate  co-operation 
within  or  among  groups’  (OECD,  2001,  p.41).  A  distinction  is  made  between  
bridging social capital (manifested in interactive learning which connects 
together different types of actors), and bonding social capital (which supports 
interactions within a group, or between the same kinds of actors). A recurring 
theme in relation to technological innovation is the importance of bridging 
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social capital  for  more  ‘disruptive’  technologies  (Christensen,  1997;;  Ehrnberg  
and Jacobsson, 1997; Lundvall et al., 2002; Maskell, 2004; Tura and 
Harmaakorpi, 2005).  
Social capital is hence likely to be implicated in the mobilisation of local and 
non-local technical, legal, financial and commercial knowledge resources to 
support development. The process of engaging local social capital with non-
local networks, in customised combination with legislative, policy or public 
finance measures, is expected to create the means to legitimising investment 
and configuring effective local solutions. Social capital is therefore likely to be 
a key factor in structuring and sustaining LEGO models. Decisions taken at 
this stage are in turn likely to result in differential significance for social capital 
in future urban energy transformation.  
Drawing on theories of the role of social capital in place-specific socio-
technical systems, and also, our detailed case study analyses presented 
below, a number of key dimensions can be identified which seem likely to 
differentiate LEGO models: decisions about ownership and control (locally 
embedded vs. non-local); the governance of subscriber, or customer, 
relationships, and level of commitment to in-house vs. outsourced techno-
economic expertise. As we elaborate in the next section, these dimensions 
interact to define place- and case-specific trajectories for urban DHC. 
4. UK local energy governance and organisation in 
practice (LEGO)  
Three contrasting UK case studies illustrate the range of objectives, 
ownership and business structures, from locally-controlled non-profit 
community energy, to public-private partnerships with corporate ownership 
and control. Case study evidence is derived from semi-structured interviews 
and documentary analysis, conducted as part of comparative research on 
DHC development.3 The local authority plays a critical, but distinctive, role in 
each case. Each has different origins and different development pathway 
dynamics, and subsequent organisation structures reflect these differences. In 
every case, DHC has been developed by a newly established ESCo, rather 
than as an in-house initiative, thus mitigating time- and resource-management 
conflicts.  
<<<  Insert  Figure  1  about  here.  Caption:  “Locations  of  DHC/CHP  case  studies. 
Reproduced from Ordnance Survey map data by permission of the Ordnance 
Survey © Crown copyright 2010.”  >>> 
4.1. Overview  
4.1.1. Aberdeen Heat and Power Ltd (AH&P) 
Aberdeen is a small city in the North East of Scotland. In 2003, Aberdeen City 
Council (ACC) established AH&P as a non-profit company, limited by 
guarantee, with a volunteer Board, to develop and operate CHP-DH. The 
                                            
3 The Heat and the City research project is funded by the UK Research Councils, Grant No: 
RES-628-25-0052 www.heatandthecity.org.uk 
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company is constituted under a general obligation to work ‘for the benefit of 
the citizens of Aberdeen’  by  tackling  fuel  poverty. As a non-profit organisation, 
any surplus is used for reinvestment or reduced heating costs. Under a fifty 
year framework agreement with the council, AH&P has developed several 
communal heat schemes, focusing on (predominantly4) council owned multi-
storey residential blocks, schools, and sports and leisure facilities. Some of 
the co-generated  electricity  is  sold  via  a  ‘private  wire’  to  a  school;;  the  
remainder is sold into the public electricity network via a consolidator. 
4.1.2. Thameswey Energy Ltd (TEL) 
Woking, in Surrey, is part of the Greater London Urban Area. The Council 
commitment to DHC resulted from environmental politics combined with 
financial concerns for energy cost saving, and in 1999 Woking Borough 
Council (WBC) created Thameswey, a commercial company wholly owned by 
the council. Thameswey in turn established TEL as a joint venture with a 
Danish commercial energy services company, to develop and operate DHC 
systems and other energy initiatives, such as solar PV arrays, within Woking 
and elsewhere. Currently TEL operates several CHP-DHC networks in 
Woking and one in Milton Keynes (about 60 miles away). Each serves 
municipal and commercial buildings, plus a small number of privately owned 
flats.  Thameswey’s  ‘articles  of  association’  require  it  to  operate  commercially, 
but to recycle its profits into environmental and energy services projects. Its 
subsidiary, TEL, also operates commercially, and profits are disbursed as 
dividends. At its incorporation, the private sector partner was the majority 
shareholder, but following a lessening of restrictions on LA trading, and 
financial constraints on its private sector partner, Thameswey became the 
majority  shareholder  (with  a  90%  stake).  Thameswey’s  directors  are  senior  
council officers, company executives, independent non-executives and a 
WBC  councillor.  TEL’s  board  is  similar,  but  includes  representatives  of  the  
private sector partner. 
4.1.3. Birmingham District Energy Company Ltd (BDEC) 
Birmingham  is  the  UK’s  second  largest  city  and  CHP-DHC has been 
developed as a component of the city authority’s  local  regeneration  strategy.  
BDEC was established in 2006, as a wholly owned subsidiary of a private 
sector company under a partnership agreement with Birmingham City Council. 
BDEC’s  parent  company,  Utilicom,  has  since  been  acquired  by  GDF-Suez 
and restructured as energy services company, Cofely. BDEC operates under 
a  25  year  ‘concession  contract’  with  the  council.  It  has  developed  and  
operates networks serving council and other public and commercial buildings, 
plus a small number of council  housing  tenants.  BDEC’s  directors  are  
employees of Cofely. The company has a partnership board for large 
subscribers, but this does not exercise formal control over the company. The 
first  5%  of  BDEC’s  profits  are  taken  to  pay  Cofely’s  costs,  and  subsequent 
profits are split 50:50 to Cofely, and to partnership board members in the form 
of an energy rebate.   
                                            
4 In the UK, social housing tenants  have  the  ‘right to buy’ their home from their landlord, so 
some of the Aberdeen multi-story blocks include a small proportion of privately owned flats. 
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4.2. LEGO: urban niche origins  
While specificities of goals of politicians and officers, and location, of the 
respective urban authorities inform the different CHP-DHC models, common 
themes concern the centrality of social capital as a resource for local learning, 
and its bridging role to national or international networks of expertise.  In each 
case, such social capital played a key part in establishing legitimacy of the 
technology, and of the role of the LA in investment, financial accounting, and 
accountability and governance in relation to subscribers/customers. 
Successful demonstration or pilot projects drawing on, and enhancing, local 
social capital proved to be important catalysts in local learning about the 
technology and mobilising wider support.  
In Aberdeen, legislation under the UK Home Energy Conservation Act (1995) 
enabled the Council to appoint a housing officer with responsibility for energy 
conservation. Access to public funding for energy saving in turn provided the 
means for formal appraisal of options for affordable warmth for the worst of 
the  council’s  electrically  heated  multi-storey housing. An appraisal metric of 
“cost in use” to tenants was used to justify rejection of the lowest capital cost 
option (refurbishment of electric heating) in favour of gas CHP-DH. The 
officer’s  access  to  formal  and  informal  social  networks  and  experience  in  anti-
poverty campaigns brought skills in negotiation and influence, and created a 
bridge to non-local networks of community energy knowledge and expertise. 
Combined with a change in financial opportunity structure, in the form of UK 
government grant funding for community energy, this enabled Council 
commitment to developing locally-controlled CHP-DH. Preparatory work 
completed under the options appraisal gave the Council an advantage in 
successful bids for funding, but local political support was critical to eventual 
legal and financial approval.  The officer proposal to the housing committee 
set out rationales and financial solutions, but Council legal advice 
recommended rejection, because of the risk to Council finances. The Deputy 
Leader of Council, as chair of the Committee, noted the advice as required, 
but set it aside and recommended agreement. The Committee decision 
resulted in the formation of a new ESCo, AH&P, as contractor to the Council 
for the provision of energy services. The interaction of local social capital, 
activation of non-local knowledge networks and provision of public finance 
proved to be critical to local innovation to bridge the gap between 
infrastructure costs, projected cash flows, and locally available housing capital. 
Aberdeen’s first pilot system was a relatively5 simple design, supplying only 
residential multi-storey buildings. Its homogeneous load profile limited its 
operating efficiency, but it enabled both ACC and the embryonic AH&P to 
build internal experience, as well as stronger legitimacy for both the 
technology and the governance model, further enhancing local social capital.  
 
Establishing legitimacy of CHP-DHC in Birmingham stemmed from committed 
actors in city engineering services, who negotiated over a long period with 
sceptical Council finance and legal teams. Risk-averse accounting and legal 
criteria, plus a short-term cost focus for procurement, and cautious local 
                                            
5 This simplicity is relative, as delivery of the first system was an extraordinary achievement, 
requiring determination and courage. 
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interpretations of EU procurement and state aid rules, proved to be obstacles 
to establishing a common view of the value of the technology. As in 
Aberdeen, fuel poverty was the initial stimulus for a pilot project, but it was 
gradual establishment of the whole life cost advantages of CHP-DHC, in 
interaction with economic regeneration goals, which provided the eventual 
justification for investment. Heat-users were an important instigator of change: 
in the 1980s, public housing tenants successfully brought court cases against 
the council, forcing them to improve building insulation and heating in a 
number of multi-storey blocks. The anticipation of successive court defeats, 
and resulting unplanned-for housing improvement costs, forced the Council to 
reconsider refurbishment priorities. Engineers were however unable to 
convince the finance team of the value of CHP/DH, and the majority of the 
multi-storey housing stock was treated with the lowest capital cost option (dry-
lining and refurbished electric heating). Building engineers did however 
convince colleagues that a small-scale pilot was feasible: a gas-fired CHP/DH 
system was installed at a local leisure centre and swimming pool, and 
connected to adjacent multi-story residences. The system received 
considerable positive publicity, with tenants able to heat their homes at 
affordable rates, and local politicians became more supportive.  
Around 2003, a new opportunity to establish CHP-DHC emerged when city 
centre regeneration plans coincided with scheduled replacement of gas 
boilers for a national convention centre. By this stage carbon management 
goals were more prominent in public policy. In the past, city engineers had 
found it difficult to contest the lowest cost criterion for building refurbishment, 
and  struggled  to  establish  the  credibility  of  a  ‘cost  in  use’  or  whole-life costing 
(WLC) evaluation. Under best practice guidance from the UK government, 
however, whole life accounting has gradually begun to be adopted by LA 
finance teams. BCC finance team doubts were assuaged by training, which 
initiated senior acceptance that WLC potentially provided more powerful 
control of engineering costs, and could be used to identify and allocate risk to 
different parties. Crises arising from plant failure and breakdowns had 
traditionally been accepted as inevitable, and the scope for unplanned costs 
was high. WLC promised better management of costs, and revised 
accounting frameworks hence created more support for DHC investment. 
In contrast with Aberdeen however, integrating CHP-DHC into regeneration 
strategy entailed risks of low take-up of heat by commercial subscribers; BCC 
was wary of taking on these risks. It was influenced in its search for a viable 
business model by a visit to the Southampton Geothermal Heating Company 
(a Utilicom/Cofely subsidiary), which relied on a private supplier to own and 
operate the system. The eventual decision to proceed to technical feasibility 
and procurement coincided with the same UK government funding for 
community energy which prompted action in Aberdeen. Negotiations between 
the Council and the preferred bidder proceeded, despite concerns about risks 
of failure continuing to be expressed by municipal finance and legal teams. 
The project is now regarded by local politicians and officers as a success, and 
has proved to be a foundation for ambitious plans for city-scale district energy. 
Woking Borough  Council’s  (WBC)  investment  in  CHP-DHC can be traced 
back to the environmental and economic priorities of local politicians. These 
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informed its 1990 Corporate Energy Efficiency Strategy to reduce the 
council’s  energy  consumption  by  40%  within  ten  years.  Energy efficiency and 
environmental considerations were mainstreamed within the council through 
training and use of environmental impact assessments (Morphet & Hams, 
1994). In 1992 a £250,000 rolling energy efficiency fund, which again 
embodied a WLC approach, was established. The fund focussed initially on 
energy management and, through the 1990s, developed small scale CHP and 
solar PV projects for council buildings. The perceived success of these pilot 
initiatives, in both financial and environmental terms, strengthened political 
support for ‘environmental entrepreneurialism’, and the Council expanded the 
model to more ambitious initiatives. Towards the end of the 1990s, 
recognising the efficiency potential of diversifying heat loads through urban 
energy, the council began examining the potential for CHP-DHC in the 
borough. In 1998, supported by a grant, WBC explored the relatively 
uncharted territories of how a local authority could develop energy services 
within its legal constraints.6 It developed Thameswey, an arms length 
company participating in joint ventures, as a means of continuing the rolling-
fund energy efficiency programmes, while drawing in private sector expertise 
and finance, and shielding the council from financial risks.  
The “environmental  entrepreneurialism”  of  the  Thameswey governance model 
required it to seek opportunities for profitable investments outside the borough, 
and in 2002 it successfully bid to deliver a sustainable energy system for new 
commercial developments on land held by English Partnerships (a national 
regeneration agency). Continuing the logic of risk encapsulation, a subsidiary 
of TEL, Thameswey Central Milton Keynes (TCMK) was established to deliver 
and operate the project. 
In earlier attempts to develop DHC in the UK, stringent accounting 
requirements, designed to prevent cross-subsidy of any LA activities defined 
as  ‘  non-core’,  have  often  prevented  investment  (Russell, 1993). In these 
three cases, the adoption of discounted cash flow appraisal is a central 
feature of justification. Different whole life financial formulae were used to 
further different primary objectives, but the reframing of cost calculations to 
bridge the traditional divide between revenue and capital budgets in UK LA 
financing enabled concerns to be addressed. Project development, supported 
by and further enhancing local social capital, could then proceed.   
4.3. Developing Project Pathways: business models, finance and 
non-local expertise 
The chequered history of DHC in the UK results in investment being 
perceived as risky and non-commercial (Russell, 1996). The lead actors in 
each of our cases pursued distinct strategies to establish a viable and 
legitimate business model. High infrastructure costs were mitigated by 
municipal commitment, although these were dealt with differently, depending 
on local objectives. The key LA role is manifested in two ways: either direct 
public investment enabled the creation of a business model with a positive 
cash flow, and/or long-term contracts between an ESCo and the LA provided 
                                            
6 At the time a local authority was required to have less than a 20% equity share in a trading 
company for their accounts to be treated separately. 
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secure heat loads and revenues. Each  LA  ‘ring-fenced’  project  finances  
through creation of dedicated energy supply organisations, whether as 
commercial or non-commercial enterprises. Long-term contracts served as 
significant financial assets, giving stability to income projections from heat 
sales. Aberdeen council created a fifty-year framework agreement with AH&P. 
Birmingham signed a 25-year energy services contract with Utilicom/Cofely, 
creating BDEC. Woking established TW and TEL as ESCos designed to 
shield the council from financial risk, while allowing CHP-DHC developments 
to proceed.  
In other dimensions however, the business models reflect locally-defined 
objectives. In Aberdeen, in addition to government grant funding, a 
Cooperative Bank loan was raised to enable the first investment. The 
Affordable Warmth Strategy justified Council commitment to act as a loan 
guarantor for AH&P, which lowered the cost of borrowing. Housing capital 
payments, transferred on a staged basis, enabled payment of interest on the 
loan. Council evaluations of the first scheme were positive, and built political 
confidence, legitimating further capital investment. Increased confidence 
meant  that  subsequent  project  funding  was  managed  via  the  Council’s  access 
to low interest Prudential Borrowing7, with loans repaid from housing capital, 
as funds became available. The terms and conditions of the government grant 
contribution to funding for each project required demonstrable carbon targets 
to be met. In the third energy centre and heat network development, the ability 
to meet the target was threatened by the poor condition of the building fabric 
in some of the multi-storey housing blocks. In order to secure the funding, 
alternative heat loads had to be found quickly. An Aberdeen Council leisure 
complex was selected as a means of achieving the carbon savings, but at 
additional cost for pipework. AH&P were concerned about the risk to business 
finances and cash flows, placing considerable pressure on Board members. 
Independent financial advice was sought by the AH&P Chair, which provided 
a solution in the form of an overdraft facility with the Co-op Bank, again 
underwritten by the Council.  
In Birmingham the Council stance was more emphatically risk-averse and 
regarded direct ownership of energy systems as creating unacceptable 
financial risks. The preferred solution was a public-private partnership (PPP) 
contract, with risks of system failure managed by the private company. 
Creation of BDEC required Utilicom to underwrite the financial risk, but the 25-
year contract signed by the Council provides guaranteed income. Again a 
share of project finance was contributed by UK government community 
energy grants, with conditions set about eventual public ownership of assets. 
BCC had a further concern about the risk that a monopoly heat/power supplier 
may charge higher prices than the best market rate. This is managed by an 
opportunity for annual challenge to proposed prices, compared to gas and 
electricity market prices. Formal contract negotiation to resolve details of legal 
and risk allocation issues between parties took considerable time. The 
business has continued to evolve with investment in energy centres at a local 
NHS hospital and University, bringing new partner members to the Board of 
                                            
7 Prudential Borrowing is the UK framework for public sector borrowing without central 
government sign-off. 
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BDEC. Negotiations over contractual relationships and assets have continued 
with the building of a new public library, designed with an integral energy 
centre owned and operated by BDEC. The whole life cost model has been 
further developed  and  extended  to  evaluate  DHC  potential  for  the  city’s  400+  
schools,  which  are  regarded  as  ‘hubs’  for  eventual  interconnected  energy  
provision across the city. 
In Woking, the original TEL business model gave the council a 19% share. 
The first DHC project was financed on an 80:20 debt to equity ratio, making 
the  council  liable  for  only  a  fraction  (3.8%)  of  the  upfront  finance.  TEL’s  debts  
are not underwritten by the council, but secured against cash flow from other 
Thameswey activities. However, the council’s  current  contribution  to  TEL’s  
financing is substantially greater than 3.8% for two reasons. First, changes in 
shareholding mean the council now ultimately owns 90% of the equity in TEL. 
Second, the council effectively operates as a long-term refinancing bank for 
the company. Initial project development draws finance from commercial 
lenders over periods of around five years. As these loans fall due (roughly 
tracking reductions in technology risks as system components are 
commissioned), debt is rolled over into loans from the council. Compliance 
with state aid rules requires these loans to be offered at commercial interest 
rates,  but  the  council’s  ability  to  borrow  on  a  long  term  (fifty  year)  basis  
translates  into  long  term  stability  in  TEL’s  repayment commitments. The 
council finances this lending by its own (lower cost) borrowing, and the 
difference  between  TEL’s  interest  payments  and  WBC’s  are  taken  into  the  
general revenue budget of the council. 
4.4. Developing Project Pathways: configuring subscribers 
Different LEGO models are informed by the composition of subscribers who 
presented the original opportunity to develop CHP-DHC: council tenants and 
leisure facilities in Aberdeen; public and commercial buildings and small 
numbers of domestic users in Birmingham and Woking. Initial subscribers 
also influence the heat available for subsequent network expansion.  
In Aberdeen, heat pricing is reflective of costs, and the main customer of 
AH&P is the council. The council manage tenant payments for heat on a fixed 
charge basis with rent. All except one of the other buildings connected are 
under council control; risks associated with supplying third parties are 
correspondingly reduced. The governance of AH&P is hence managed by its 
subscribers, with councillor, ex-officer and community organisation board 
members, as well as provision for tenant representatives. Expansion of the 
network to commercial subscribers would introduce new risks of bad debt, 
which the council would not underwrite. In addition the council is concerned to 
ensure  that  any  future  commercial  supply  would  not  impinge  on  AH&P’s  
capacity to supply public housing and facilities.  
In Woking and Birmingham, the mix of public and commercial subscribers 
introduces significant governance challenges. Thameswey uses the 
subsidiary TEL as a means to shield the council from underwriting commercial 
contracts, but this exacerbates recruitment difficulties. Lack of local familiarity 
with the technology, the small scale of the Thameswey group (in comparison 
with dominant energy utilities), and the lack of consumer protection and 
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industry standards for heat supply, contribute to perceptions of risk. In the 
absence of WBC financial guarantees, lengthy legal negotiations with 
commercial customers have been necessary to establish a bespoke contract 
designed to protect their interests. 
Similar issues have been confronted in Birmingham. While Utilicom 
(subsequently Cofely) could rely on its parent company to underwrite 
commercial contracts, early negotiations with potential subscribers were 
marked by demands for extremely high insurance compensation rates for 
supply failure. Businesses were eventually persuaded about reliability through 
evidence of Utilicom system performance and experience. In neither 
Birmingham nor Woking are subscribers meaningfully integrated into 
governance. In BDEC, a partnership board has representation for founder 
subscribers, but the board does not control decision-making. Heat prices are 
benchmarked against equivalent gas heating, with the opportunity for annual 
challenge. Although the city council is lead subscriber, it faces difficulty in 
delivering network connections to housing tenants, because of the BDEC 
commercial model. Housing tenants represent relatively high cost and high 
risk customers for a business whose priority is profitability. This means there 
is little incentive to extend the system to the multi-storey housing in 
regeneration areas. Extensions to public housing so far have required public 
funding, and in one case have been done directly by the council. In 
Thameswey and TEL, the council is the only subscriber integrated into 
governance. Heat prices are benchmarked against gas and electricity prices, 
and subscribers can request price review after five years. A small proportion 
of TEL’s  heat  and  electricity  is  sold  to  domestic  subscribers,  though  as  owner  
occupiers and private rentals these are treated as lower risk than social 
housing tenants.   
4.5. Developing Project Pathways: engagement with energy 
markets and techno-economic expertise 
While DHC networks can use heat from a wide range of sources, gas CHP is 
a commonly used technology in the UK. The availability of gas from domestic 
and imported sources mitigates supply risks, and the higher price of electricity 
over  gas  (the  “spark  spread”)  enables  CHP  heat  to  be  priced  below  that  of  
individual gas boilers, the main competing option (Kelly & Pollitt, 2010). 
Electricity revenues from CHP are  also  ‘naturally  hedged’: UK electricity 
prices generally follow wholesale gas prices, because gas fired power stations 
are often the marginal (price-setting) electricity generating plant.  
Electricity produced by CHP generators may be used in different ways, 
including (in order of net revenues generated): on-site, or supplied directly to 
other users via a private wire, or sold via the public system through other 
companies (Toke & Fragaki, 2008). The LEGO models described here adopt 
different approaches, reflecting the degree of expertise held within the ESCo. 
A proportion of the electricity generated by AH&P is supplied via private wires 
to a school, but the majority is sold at a fixed tariff through a consolidator. The 
contract with the consolidator shields AH&P from requirements to balance 
electricity supply with demand; hence the CHP engines are operated in 
response to heat demand without the complexity of responding to electricity 
markets. Since the consolidator bears the electricity balancing risks, the tariff 
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offered is relatively low: Toke & Fragaki (2008) estimate that the consolidator 
model provides around three quarters of the revenue that an equivalent 
generator selling directly onto wholesale markets would receive. 
Thameswey’s  longer  history  of  system  performance  data, and development of 
local expertise, enables it to take more active positions in energy markets, 
trading on spot and forward markets for gas supply, and selling electricity in 
response to market conditions. While administrative and credit requirements 
of participation prevent Thameswey selling directly to wholesale markets, its 
consolidator arrangement offers a higher average tariff in return for exposing 
the company to electricity grid balancing risks. TEL also offers Short Term 
Operating Reserve services to the electricity network operator as part of an 
aggregation of small generators. Both of these arrangements yield higher 
revenues than fixed-tariff consolidator models, but require greater in-house 
expertise. They also create incentives for operation of the CHP engines in 
response to electricity market demand, rather than local heat demand. Given 
limited heat storage capacity, this can lead to heat dumping, which diminishes 
carbon savings. 
4.6. Dimensions of Local Energy Governance and Organisation 
Four key dimensions can be identified to differentiate between the niche 
origins and development pathways of the case studies described above; 
these are summarised in Table 1. The dimensions are not necessarily 
exhaustive of all possibilities, but they do usefully highlight consequential 
variations of governance and organisation.  
None of these three developments could have taken shape without the 
commitment of local actors (politicians and officers) to the mobilisation of 
social capital through wider networks of knowledge and expertise. Such UK-
wide networks derived from civil society anti-poverty campaigns (Aberdeen 
and Birmingham) and environmental movements (Woking) on the one hand, 
and, on the other, from businesses supplying urban energy development, 
finance and engineering services (all three cases). Success was also 
dependent on a component of public finance, the availability of which 
depended on policy recognition of the contribution of urban distributed 
generation to affordable low carbon energy.  
Social capital is positioned differentially with respect to future extension of the 
projects, however, with different local objectives (affordable warmth in 
Aberdeen, energy and carbon saving in Woking and economic regeneration in 
Birmingham) lending different emphases to governance. In AH&P 
enhancement of social capital across different sections of civil society 
(housing tenants, community organisations, urban energy knowledge 
networks) is critical to the non-profit model of the business. In Thameswey 
social capital is integral to profit-oriented business development, with profit 
directed to socially-defined goals of energy and carbon reduction. For 
Birmingham council, BDEC is the instrument to deliver low carbon energy 
services, on a profit-making basis, using non-local techno-economic and 
finance expertise. Social capital is notionally on the margins of the business 
model, but is central to attaining public goals for city-wide low carbon energy. 
The latter will not be delivered in the absence of on-going engagement 
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between  the  municipality  and  BDEC’s  parent  company,  whose  primary  goal  is  
profitability.  
Table 1. Key dimensions of organisation and governance for CHP-DHC in the 
UK 
 Aberdeen Woking  Birmingham 
 
Balance between 
social and 
financial capital 
in business 
model 
Social capital 
orientation: 
tackling fuel 
poverty priority 
Mixed social-
financial capital, 
‘environmental 
entrepreneurialism’ 
Dominant 
financial capital 
orientation; 
commercially-led  
Locally 
embedded /non-
local ownership 
Locally 
embedded, with 
strong ties to 
Aberdeen 
Council 
Locally embedded, 
with European 
minority partner 
 
 
Locally specific 
delivery vehicle; 
partnership with 
local actors; non-
local ownership 
(Cofely UK/ GDF-
Suez) 
Governance role 
for main 
subscribers 
Main subscriber 
(the Council) is 
integral to 
organisation and 
governance, but 
Board is 
independent and 
voluntary 
Multiple 
commercial and 
public subscribers, 
among whom only 
the local council is 
part of governance 
structure 
Major 
subscribers are 
members of a 
partnership 
board, but do not 
have formal 
control over 
decision making 
In-house or 
outsourced 
techno-economic 
expertise 
Reliance on third 
parties for 
development, 
maintenance and 
financial control; 
progressively 
bringing in- 
house 
Drew on expertise 
of private partner, 
but developed 
commercial 
expertise in-house 
Reliant on parent 
company 
expertise 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
Although wide-ranging reforms of the UK energy regime are on-going, and the 
potential for urban low carbon heat and cooling networks is recognised by 
policy-makers, DHC remains caught in the squeezed middle ground between 
greater efforts at large-scale national infrastructure investment on the supply 
side, and individual householder incentives on the demand side. In these 
cases urban energy is irreducibly bespoke and tied to local context, and to 
multi-organisation networks of expertise, bridging local knowledge, 
governments and financial and energy markets. Our findings support Kelly 
and Pollitt’s  (2010)  conclusion  that  the  technology  offers long term benefits to 
the UK, but faces significant short to medium term barriers, arising from 
economic risk, regulatory uncertainty and energy system lock-in to large scale 
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technologies and networks. Business sustainability is sensitive to factors 
largely outside the control of the CHP-DHC system, including relative fuel 
prices and access to electricity distribution networks. Ultimately, a number of 
systematic barriers remain, especially the challenges of long-term 
infrastructure development, stemming from upfront costs, energy market 
volatility and long payback periods. Its development faces particular 
challenges in the context of UK energy institutions and organisations which, 
oriented significantly to financial capital, emphasise de-risking by delocalising 
and standardising investment propositions.  
Given the current uncertainties over policy and regulatory support for urban 
governance of sustainable energy, prospects of significant urban energy 
transformation remain marginal. The cases show that development in 
unsupportive circumstances requires forms of social capital which enable 
project developers to overcome the difficulties posed by delocalised 
investment finance. In two cases, Aberdeen and Woking, where local actors 
sought to retain control over the revenues (as well as the risks) from urban 
energy provision, governance and the mobilisation of finance continue to 
prove highly demanding. The instabilities and short-termism of globalised 
finance capital tend to weaken social capital, trust and cohesion in innovation 
governance:  ‘increasingly  it  is  finance  capital  that  judges  what  is  “good-
practice”  among  firms  as  well  as  among  governments  …  the  uninhibited  rule  
of finance capital gets into serious conflict with some of the fundamental 
prerequisites  for  the  sustainability  of  the  learning  economy’  (Lundvall  et  al.,  
2002, p.225). Interactive learning, and development of locally-embedded 
expertise seems to be facilitated in more stable social and financial 
arrangements, such as those evident in the less formal, trust-based German 
system than in US more formal contract-based innovation system, 
characterised by relatively mobile flows of capital and personnel (Nooteboom, 
2000). The UK context resembles the latter more than the former.  
While the UK arguably represents an extreme case of local governance 
fragmentation, European local governance has undergone parallel shifts. 
Scandinavian DHC systems were generally developed by municipal 
authorities, either as in-house projects, or more commonly through 
municipally owned energy companies, as part of an integrated approach to 
urban infrastructure development (Dyrelund & Steffensen, 2004; Ericson, 
2009; Rutherford, 2008). Liberalisation is diminishing municipal control over 
energy provision, and financial pressures, coupled with political difficulties in 
adopting market-based tariffs, have led European local and regional 
authorities to greater privatisation of their energy companies (Monstadt, 2007; 
Ericson, 2009; Rutherford, 2008). Attempts to develop (or enable the 
development) of DHC in UK cities, therefore, illustrate more general European 
issues concerned with the interaction between energy and financial markets 
and local governance and control. They also provide insight into interactions 
between governance and socio-technical infrastructures (energy, waste, water, 
transport) whose reconfiguration could address urban priorities, but whose 
organisation is rarely controlled at city level (Hodson & Marvin, 2010). 
Indeed, an over-arching lesson from these three cases is that effective 
governance and organisation for socio-technical DHC is likely to require not 
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top-down command and control planning, but a combination of centrally-
established supportive standards and incentives with devolved municipal 
powers. As well as responding to the problem of infrastructure finance for heat 
networks, UK and devolved governments could ensure more strategic use of 
spatial planning powers, and development of common technical DHC 
standards and consumer protections. The necessary counterpart to such 
central measures is greater devolved municipal control over financial and 
technical resources for sustainable urban energy. The four dimensions of 
local energy governance and organisation we identified here suggest ways in 
which this could be achieved. The ESCo shell structure used in each case 
provided a device for clarity in business governance, without determining the 
particular combinations of social and finance capital, knowledge and expertise. 
It gave latitude to actors to develop locally-viable multi-organisation models. 
Parameters of financial risk were made susceptible to greater transparency 
and accountability, and compliance with LA trading regulations was enabled. 
In sum, a combination of social and financial capitals was critical to the 
structuring of ownership and control, governance roles for subscribers, and 
developing local capacity to access global expertise and energy markets 
effectively.  
Support from central governments to change the regulatory parameters would 
reshape the risk calculus, by integrating social and environmental goods into 
dominant financial evaluation practices, as practiced under a number of other 
European models.8 Within this, scope needs to be retained for empowering 
local actors to shape innovative solutions, while reducing uncertainties, 
streamlining development and mobilising investment. This would allow for 
greater recognition of the value of locally-optimised solutions devised by 
meshing of local and global expertise. It should enable accelerated 
transferable learning between projects, and shared standard templates for 
legal compliance. This approach optimises the value of municipal capacities 
(long-term commitment, local democratic participation, and local knowledge) 
and enables the local authority to act as a quasi-regulator to reduce 
downstream transaction costs, improve systems design and energy saving, 
and to give greater clarity to the implications of different control and ownership 
arrangements. By this means, rule-oriented and decontextualizing finance 
capital could be made to work better in support of social capital, local 
commitment and capacity, rather than devaluing these resources. In turn, the 
enhancement of knowledge and capacities contribute to more resilient local 
economies and sustainable urban energy. 
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